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Killing the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg: 
Outdated Employment Laws Are Destroying the 
Gig Economy 
Emily C. Atmore∗ 
A college student trying to alleviate steep tuition costs in 
between an erratic class schedule. A single mother saving for a 
trip to Disney World with her five-year-old daughter. A salesman 
subleasing his empty condo while he travels across the country. 
A retiree looking for a productive activity to fill long days. A stay-
at-home mom with a lucrative knack for knitting. 
What do all of these people have in common? They are your 
Uber and Lyft drivers, Airbnb hosts, Instacart shoppers, and 
Etsy shop owners. They are your neighbors, friends, and family. 
They are the independent workforce. There are roughly fifty-four 
million of them (and counting) and they comprise the gig econ-
omy.1  
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. Busi-
ness Administration & Accounting, University of St. Thomas. I am grateful to 
Professor Brett McDonnell who challenged and guided me during the research 
and writing of this Note. Thank you to the board and staff of Minnesota Law 
Review, especially Steve Owen, Dion Farganis, Ron Waclawski, and Frank 
Guenthner, for their invaluable commentary, and Rebecca Krystosek, Mitch 
Noordyke and Devin Driscoll, for their editorial expertise. Thank you also to my 
friends and family for cheering me on from near and far. Most importantly, a 
heartfelt thank you to my parents, Robert Atmore and Carolyn Cole, for their 
unwavering support and endless encouragement in law school and in everything 
else I do. Copyright © 2017 by Emily C. Atmore. 
 1. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE, NECESSITY 
AND THE GIG ECONOMY 3 (Oct. 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/ 
employment-and-growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-and-the-gig 
-economy (“Overall, our research suggests that there are 54 million to 68 million 
independent earners in the United States . . . .”); Stephane Kasriel, No, We 
Won’t All Be Freelancers in the Future of Work, FAST CO. (Oct. 24, 2017), https:// 
www.fastcompany.com/40484760/no-we-wont-all-be-freelancers-in-the-future 
-of-work (“Over 57 million Americans took on freelance work in some capacity 
[in 2017]—that’s 36% of the U.S. workforce, up from 53 million in 2014.”). 
 888 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:887 
 
The gig economy is the popular name given to the new world 
of work: flexible, exciting jobs that unleash innovation and pro-
mote economic growth.2 These jobs are aptly labeled “gigs.”3 
They are characterized by their flexible, autonomous, and short-
term nature.4 The gig economy is also known for its innovative 
use of websites or mobile applications to connect gig workers di-
rectly with customers, producing better services at lower prices.5 
Despite its growing appeal, the gig economy is threatened 
by a web of legal complications.6 Most notably, gig workers are 
not often or easily classified as employees under federal and 
state employment laws.7 When workers are not classified as em-
ployees, by default, they are classified as independent contrac-
tors. This classification limits these workers’ access to tradi-
tional employment benefits such as minimum wage and 
overtime pay, protection against discrimination, workplace 
safety regulations, payroll tax contributions, unemployment in-
surance, social security, disability insurance, Medicare, workers 
compensation insurance, health insurance, and retirement sav-
ings plans.8 The difference in designation between an employee 
 
 2. See John Gapper, New ‘Gig’ Economy Spells End to Lifetime Careers, 
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ab492ffc-3522-11e5-b05b 
-b01debd57852 (“‘[The gig economy] is creating exciting economies and unleash-
ing innovation . . . .’” (quoting Hillary Clinton)). The name sharing economy is 
also commonly used interchangeably with gig economy. 
 3. The term gig originated in popularity in the 1950s to refer to a job or 
task in which one was not necessarily invested, but simply took to pay the bills. 
This term was used in contrast to a real job, meaning the lifelong nine-to-five 
salaried desk job with a benefits package that became the prevalent form of 
employment in this era. Geoff Nunberg, Commentary, Goodbye Jobs, Hello 
‘Gigs’: How One Word Sums Up a New Economic Reality, NPR (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/11/460698077/goodbye-jobs-hello-gigs-nunbergs 
-word-of-the-year-sums-up-a-new-economic-reality. 
 4. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 2. 
 5. Will Rinehart, The Modern Online Gig Economy, Consumer Benefits, 
and the Importance of Regulatory Humility, AM. ACTION F. (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-modern-online-gig 
-economy-consumer-benefit-and-the-importance-of-regula (“[C]onsumers have 
flocked to these networked services because of the added convenience, lower 
prices, and higher quality services.”). 
 6. See Gapper, supra note 2 (“‘[The gig economy] is also raising hard ques-
tions about workplace protections and what a good job will look like in [the] 
future.’” (quoting Hillary Clinton)). 
 7. See Nunberg, supra note 3 (“[I]n the future, work will be less secure but 
lots more exciting. We can make our own schedule and hours, pick the projects 
that interest us, work from anywhere and try our hands at different trades.”). 
 8. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing La-
bor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker” 7 (The 
Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2015-10, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/ 
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and an independent contractor hinges on employment classifica-
tion tests that were drafted during the Industrial Revolution 
with the traditional worker in mind. Today’s gig workers “do not 
seem to fit into either of the binary worker categories—though 
far from traditional employees, they also bear little resemblance 
to [the] independent, small-business-operating contractors” that 
were originally envisioned.9 Gig workers are “square pegs” being 
forced to fit into employee classification tests consisting of “two 
round holes.”10 And existing employment law “provides nothing 
remotely close to a clear answer” to this problem.11  
There is widespread value in resolving employee misclassi-
fication issues: when workers are incorrectly classified, all par-
ties suffer.12 Workers are potentially denied rights and benefits 
that legislators have always been extremely careful to protect.13 
Employers, though they may benefit from cost savings of mis-
classification,14 are financially threatened by legal retribution.15 
Congress loses billions in tax revenue16 and courts suffer from 
 
ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/Documents/ 
modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf. 
 9. Jennifer Pinsof, Note, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Mis-
classification in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 
341, 344 (2016). 
 10. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (2015) (“[T]he jury in this 
case will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round 
holes.”). 
 11. Id. at 1082.  
 12. Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification (last visited Nov. 
30, 2017) (“The misclassification of employees as independent contractors pre-
sents one of the most serious problems facing affected workers, employers and 
the entire economy.”). 
 13. DEP’T FOR PROF. EMPLOYEES, MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 1 (2016), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
Misclassification-of-Employees-2016.pdf [hereinafter MISCLASSIFICATION OF 
EMPLOYEES] (“The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that employers 
have misclassified millions of workers nationally as independent contractors.”). 
 14. Id. at 3 (“[T]ax savings, as well as savings from income and Medicare 
taxes results in employers saving between 20 to 40 percent on labor costs.”). For 
a list of other advantages, see id. For a breakdown of Uber ’s potential cost in-
creases, see Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here’s What It Would Cost Uber to 
Pay Its Drivers as Employees, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/ 
2015/09/17/ubernomics.  
 15. Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to 
Death, FAST CO. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/ 
the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death (“This rising legal 
retribution is a huge threat to the gig economy.”). 
 16. NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICA-
TION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES 
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inefficiency and uncertainty.17 The rise of the gig economy has 
exacerbated the detrimental effects of misclassification, making 
it imperative that employment statutes are reviewed and the 
confusing tests that define them are revised. Until this occurs, 
lawsuits will continue to be filed, gig workers will continue to be 
denied protections, and gig companies will go bankrupt.  
This Note argues that current employment laws do not ade-
quately embrace gig economy workers, and create dangerous ob-
stacles to needed economic growth. It urges the necessary imple-
mentation of an immediate solution that properly balances and 
protects the interests of entrepreneurial business owners and in-
dependent workers. Part I presents a historical overview of em-
ployment law in the United States and outlines the development 
of the gig economy. Part II analyzes the improper application of 
employee classification factors to independent workers and dis-
cusses the underlying tension between promoting economic 
growth and protecting individual interests. Part III advocates for 
comprehensive legal reform to preserve economic opportunity, 
promote economic efficiency, and protect economic security. Ul-
timately, Part III proposes the implementation of a temporary 
safe harbor to protect gig companies from the detrimental liabil-
ity of employee misclassification, while reexamining both exist-
ing employee classification tests and the long-term separation of 
welfare benefits from employment altogether. 
I.  EXAMINING THE GIG ECONOMY’S CLASH WITH 
EMPLOYMENT LAWS   
While employment law has been developing for several cen-
turies and the modern gig economy is commonly considered to 
have only developed in the last decade,18 the present difficulties 
in employee misclassification illuminate an unresolved funda-
 
2 (July 22, 2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Independent-Contractor 
-Costs.pdf (“State and federal governments lose billions in revenues annually.”). 
This impact will not be further discussed in this Note. 
 17. Alan B. Krueger, Modernizing Labor Laws in the Online Gig Economy, 
HAMILTON PROJECT 7 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/ 
assets/files/labor_laws_gig_economy_krueger_harris_transcript_12-9-2015.pdf 
(“[Gig] relationships fall into this gray area. And that’s creating a tremendous 
amount of legal uncertainty, inefficiency and costs in our system today . . . .”). 
 18. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 10 box 2. 
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mental clash between employee protection and economic devel-
opment.19 This Part presents the current legal interaction be-
tween employment laws and the modern economy. Section A ex-
amines the origin of the employer-employee relationship, 
describes the development of employment law, and outlines the 
modern day employee classification tests: the common law con-
trol test and the economic realities test. Section B provides an 
in-depth introduction to the gig economy and its central differ-
ences from the traditional workforce model. Section C reviews 
historic and current clashes between employment law and eco-
nomic development. This Part establishes that existing employ-
ment laws are unable to effectively support the gig economy.  
A. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION 
TESTS 
Employment law developed as a result of a legislative push 
for employee protections that became most prominent during the 
Industrial Revolution.20 It was at this time that the historical 
master-servant relationship was complicated by an “explosion of 
new occupations and ways of organizing work [which ultimately] 
shattered this simplicity.”21 Industrialization created what has 
been deemed the traditional workforce: salaried workers with a 
forty-hour work week in lifetime-long manufacturing careers. 
This refined work structure created an array of social and legal 
complications for vulnerable employees and gave immense 
power to employers.22 In response, legislators became chiefly 
concerned with elevating individual workers’ rights and curtail-
ing employer power amidst the rampantly growing industrial 
landscape. 
 
 19. See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Econ-
omy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2016) (“The current context may be new, 
but the difficulty of classifying workers long predates the on-demand economy. 
More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court concluded that, ‘[f ]ew prob-
lems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results 
than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial 
dealing.’” (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944))). 
 20. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It 
Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 
301 (2001). 
 21. Id. at 303. 
 22. Id. at 306 (“[Worker insecurity] became more obvious as employment 
relations became less domestic and paternalistic, and grew more industrial, 
complex and impersonal.”). 
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Since that time, numerous laws have been implemented to 
restrain employer power over employees, protect employees from 
employer discrimination, and serve to entice workers to remain 
employed with their employers.23 These laws provide access to 
fair wages and pay, unemployment insurance, social security 
benefits, disability insurance, workers insurance, health insur-
ance, and retirement savings plans.24 Because these laws are in-
tended to govern the employer-employee relationship, they are 
activated only upon creation of an employer-employee relation-
ship. This dynamic has created a critical difference between the 
definition of employee and nonemployees, or independent con-
tractors. Independent contractors are distinguished from em-
ployees by their autonomous nature; they contract with employ-
ers to perform work under a specific set of conditions (that is, for 
a specific task, duration, or intended result) but “retain inde-
pendence and self-management over their performance.”25 The 
distinction between employee and independent contractor has 
become vital to determining to whom many legal protections and 
benefits are owed.26 Definitions vary between statutes, but are 
frequently written so broadly as to provide no worthwhile defi-
nition at all.27 Legislative ambiguity left the task of defining the 
scope of employment to the courts.28  
In an attempt to create applicable distinctions between em-
ployees and independent contractors, courts initially sought 
guidance from the original master-servant relationship.29 Two 
 
 23. See generally Carlson, supra note 20, at 304 (outlining the development 
of employment law). 
 24. Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 7. 
 25. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law 
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996); 
see Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 7 (“Independent contractors control the 
methods and means of the work they perform for others, make significant capi-
tal investments, possibly employ others, and retain the opportunity for profit or 
loss.”). 
 26. Carlson, supra note 20, at 301. 
 27. See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[The 
Act contains] no definition that solves problems as to the limits of the employer-
employee relationship.” (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 
728 (1947))). 
 28. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (“We 
have often been asked to construe the meaning of ‘employee’ where the statute 
containing the term does not helpfully define it.”). 
 29. Carlson, supra note 20, at 304.  
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tests emerged: the control test,30 followed eventually by the eco-
nomic realities test.31 While there are many factors that courts 
consider as a part of each of these tests, the central focus of each 
test is clearly control and independence: the control the employer 
has over the worker versus the level of independence the worker 
has from the employer.32 Some courts have argued that these 
tests are so similar that “there is no functional difference be-
tween the . . . formulations.”33 Over time, courts at both the state 
and federal level have also applied hybrid analyses that combine 
the elements of each of these tests.34 A myriad of judicial inter-
pretations, along with statutory vagueness, has created signifi-
cant confusion as to the correct employment classification of 
workers and the existence of related legal rights. 
 
 30. See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 662 (2013) (“The common law ‘control test’ comes out 
of the original conceptions of master and servant from pre-industrial English 
law, and the Supreme Court has used this test as the default definition of the 
term ‘employee’ in federal statutes.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 220 (1958) (defining a servant as essentially synonymous with an 
employee).  
 31. For detailed charts laying out the differences between the common law 
control test and the economic realities test, see Charles J. Muhl, What is an 
Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law, 125 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 
3, 6 exhibit 1 (2002). 
 32. The more control a company has over a worker and the more dependent 
the worker is on the company, the more likely a worker will be classified as an 
employee. Control and independence are the two main factors that this Note 
will analyze in Part II, infra. 
 33. Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010); 
see also Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 20 F.3d 
938, 941–42 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 34. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing 
the analysis that has become known as the hybrid test); see also Frankel v. 
Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing the “wider trend” to 
apply the hybrid test); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(applying the hybrid test). For a more thorough explanation of the hybrid test, 
see Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case 
for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independ-
ent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 250–52 (1997). Because use of hybrid con-
trol and economic realities tests varies significantly between jurisdictions, these 
variations will not be explored in detail in this Note. 
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1. Common Law Control Test 
The control test is based on agency law.35 Courts have cre-
ated a presumption that this interpretation applies unless Con-
gress specifically indicates otherwise.36 This test is focused on 
defining an employer’s “right to control” the work of his employ-
ees.37 It consists of ten factors, none of which are to be empha-
sized more than any other.38 These factors are: (1) control; (2) 
supervision; (3) integration; (4) skill level; (5) continuing rela-
tionship; (6) tools and location; (7) method of payment; (8) intent; 
(9) employment by more than one company; and (10) type of busi-
ness.39 A court will use these factors to determine whether the 
relationship is that of an employee or an independent contractor: 
“an employer controls the details of an employee’s work, but only 
the results of a[n independent] contractor’s work.”40 
 
 35. See Bodie, supra note 30, at 713.  
 36. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 318 (1992) 
(“Where a statute containing that term does not helpfully define it, this Court 
presumes that Congress means an agency law definition unless it clearly indi-
cates otherwise.”). 
 37. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (“This right of control need not extend to every possible detail of the work. 
Rather, the relevant question is whether the entity retains ‘all necessary con-
trol’ over the worker ’s performance.”); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of In-
dus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 415 (1989) (“The existence of such right of control, 
and not the extent of its exercise, gives rise to the employer-employee relation-
ship.”). 
 38. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 324 (“Since the common-law 
test contains ‘no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find 
the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive.’” (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of 
Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968))). 
 39. Pinsof, supra note 9, at 347; see also Muhl, supra note 31, at 7, exhibit 
7 (2002). There are many versions of the common law Control Test: The IRS has 
adopted a twenty-factor “Right to Control” test that includes additional factors 
beyond those in common law. Many state courts have developed their own ver-
sions of the common law test with other added factors. For more information on 
common law test variations, see Pinsof, supra note 9, at 347 n.3. 
 40. Carlson, supra note 20, at 339 (emphasis added); see Quintanilla v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017 (T.C. 2016) (“An independ-
ent contractor is one who works for another but according to his own manner 
and method, free from direction or right of direction in matters relating to per-
formance of work save as to results.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, 
§ 220 cmt. e (1958); MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 13, at 1 
(2016) (“An independent contractor provides a good or service to another indi-
vidual or business, often under the terms of a contract that dictates the work 
outcome, but the contractor retains control over how they provide the good or 
service. The independent contractor is not subject to the employer ’s control or 
guidance except as designated in a mutually binding agreement. The contract 
for a specific job usually describes its expected outcome.”). 
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The control test applies to several federal statutes, including 
(but not limited to): the Employee Retirement Security Act 
(ERISA),41 which “establishes minimum standards for retire-
ment, health, and other welfare benefit plans, including life in-
surance [and] disability insurance” for employees;42 the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which affords employees a right to 
unionize and permits collective bargaining;43 and the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Law (FUTA) and Federal Insurance Contri-
butions Act (FICA), which govern employer and employee tax ob-
ligations for unemployment insurance, social security, and Med-
icare benefits.44 These statutes rely on this test to determine 
when a worker is deemed an employee and thus is entitled to 
certain benefits from their employer.  
2. Economic Realities Test 
The economic realities test was created as an alternative to 
the common law control test. Courts utilize this test when Con-
gress clearly intended the statute in question to be applied more 
broadly than the control test permits.45 Although both this test 
and the control test consider the employer’s control over its em-
ployees, the economic realities test is focused less on the “tech-
 
 41. Or some version of the control test, as described above. See discussion 
supra note 39; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323 (noting the 
circular nature of ERISA’s definition of “employee” and thus “adopt[ing] a com-
mon-law [control] test for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under 
ERISA”). 
 42. ERISA Plan, TOTAL ADMIN. SERV. CORP. (2016), https://www.tasconline 
.com/biz-resource-center/plans/erisa-plan; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
503 U.S. at 323 (interpreting the definition of employee under ERISA). 
 43. Rights We Protect: Employee Rights, NAT. LAB. REL. BD., https://www 
.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). 
 44. Federal Unemployment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs 
.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/federal-unemployment-tax (last vis-
ited Nov. 30, 2017); Employers’ Responsibility for FICA Payroll Taxes, BIZFIL-
INGS, https://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/research-topics/managing-your-taxes/ 
payroll-taxes/employers-responsibility-for-fica-payroll-taxes (last visited Nov. 
30, 2017). 
 45. See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has observed, however, that the ‘striking 
breadth’ of the FLSA’s definition of ‘employ’ ‘stretches the meaning of “em-
ployee” to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict ap-
plication of traditional agency law principles . . . .’”); United States v. Rosen-
wasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945) (“The use of the words ‘each’ and ‘any’ to 
modify ‘employee,’ which in turn is defined to include ‘any’ employed individual, 
leaves no doubt as to the Congressional intention to include all employees 
within the scope of the Act unless specifically excluded.”). 
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nical concepts” than on the “economic realities” of the relation-
ship, as the name suggests.46 The focal point of the analysis is 
“whether the individual is economically dependent on the busi-
ness to which he renders service . . . or is, as a matter of economic 
fact, in business for himself.”47 The factors of this test, which 
should be weighed equally,48 include: “(1) the degree of control 
exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the worker’s 
opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker’s investment in the 
business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; (5) the 
degree of skill required to perform the work; and (6) the extent 
to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business.”49 
Courts have applied the economic realities test to a number 
of federal statutes, including (but not limited to): the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), which sets minimum wage and overtime 
pay requirements for employees;50 the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), which provides certain protections for eligible employ-
ees in the event of necessary health or family leave;51 and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prevents employers 
 
 46. See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists for pur-
poses of the FLSA should be grounded in ‘economic reality rather than technical 
concepts.’” (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop. Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 
(1961))). 
 47. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotations omitted); see David Weil, Administrator ’s Interpretation 
No. 2015-1, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (July 15, 2015), http://www.blr.com/html_email/ 
AI2015-1.pdf; MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 13, at 3 (“An em-
ployee who only invests time in one enterprise and who sells his or her services 
to only one ‘customer,’ the employer, is economically dependent upon that work. 
An independent contractor is in business for him or herself, invests in his or her 
own equipment and supplies, and has a broad customer base.”). 
 48. See Weil, supra note 47 (“The factors should not be analyzed mechani-
cally or in a vacuum, and no single factor, including control, should be over-
emphasized. Instead, each factor should be considered in light of the ultimate 
determination of whether the worker is really in business for him or herself (and 
thus is an independent contractor) or is economically dependent on the em-
ployer (and thus is its employee).”). 
 49. Flint Eng’g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d at 1440 (citing Brock v. Superior 
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058–59 (2d Cir. 1988)); Muhl, supra note 31, at 8 
exhibit 3. 
 50. Coverage Under the FLSA, FLSA, http://www.flsa.com/coverage.html 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2017); see, e.g., Sec’y of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 
1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (using the economic realities test to interpret employee in 
the context of the FLSA). 
 51. FMLA (Family & Medical Leave), U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol 
.gov/general/topic/benefits-leave/fmla (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (including up 
to twelve weeks of unpaid protected leave). 
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from discriminating in hiring, firing, and paying of employees on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”52 
These statutes use this broadly written test to determine when 
a worker is owed these fundamental protections. 
B. THE RISE OF THE GIG ECONOMY AND THE INDEPENDENT 
WORKFORCE 
Courts developed employee classification tests during an era 
when the employer-employee relationship was the most preva-
lent work arrangement.53 Although independent contractors ex-
isted, they were far from legislative focus and, consequently, con-
tractors received little legal attention. Thus statutory benefits 
and protections were only established for employees, who were 
considered the center of the workforce, and did not apply to the 
much smaller subset of independent contractors.54 Nevertheless, 
in the last decade independent work has grown significantly 
more popular, leaving an increasing share of the workforce with-
out the legal protections that were intended to cover them.55 
The gig economy is the label given to describe this recent 
increase in supply and demand for independent work arrange-
ments.56 Companies have embraced gig work and are able to fa-
cilitate these job opportunities based on a very lean business 
 
 52. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPOR-
TUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2017). 
 53. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 25, at 663. (“Most labor and employment 
laws assume a paradigmatic relationship between an ‘employer ’ and ‘employee.’ 
The employer in this model contracts directly with an individual employee to 
perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer ’s ac-
tual or potential supervision over the employee’s method, manner, time and 
place of performance. This model describes most workers well enough, but there 
has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with recip-
ients of services.”). 
 54. See id. (stating that there is valid concern that many alternative work-
ers are not included in protective regulations). 
 55. See Joseph Shuford, Note, Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and Peer-to-Peer 
Rentals: The Sharing Economy, North Carolina, and the Constitution, 16 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 301, 309–12 (2015), http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1295&context=ncjolt (comparing the extensive reach of 
companies such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb). 
 56. See Nunberg, supra note 3. (“It’s been called the on-demand economy, 
the 1099 economy, the peer-to-peer economy and freelance nation [among other 
things including the sharing economy]. But over the past year, investors, the 
business media and politicians seem to have settled on ‘the gig economy.’”). 
Though there are small differences between each of these names, for purposes 
of this Note, they will be treated as synonymous and the ideas generally encap-
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model wherein “companies fissure jobs into discrete tasks, or 
‘gigs,’ to be performed by contracted workers on a temporary ba-
sis.”57 Gig companies use technology to provide a mutually ben-
eficial platform that connects workers and customers on de-
mand: workers with a profitable service, skill, or good are 
instantly connected with customers that are in need of such ser-
vice, skill, or good.58 These companies have developed in many 
different forms. They are rideshare companies like Uber and 
Lyft,59 which allow drivers to use their own cars to offer taxi-like 
rides to passengers; accommodation companies like Airbnb, 
which permits people to monetize their homes by renting them 
to travelers; delivery companies like Instacart, which provides 
instant shopping and delivery of grocery-store goods; and entre-
preneurial marketplaces like Etsy, which offers a worldwide 
platform for designers, inventors, and other creators to showcase 
their goods in their own virtual shop.60 Gig workers are given 
the opportunity to work independently, free from the typical re-
strictions of a nine-to-five desk job.61 These jobs are extremely 
 
sulated in the term gig economy. For more information on some of the differ-
ences, see Megan Carboni, A New Class of Worker for the Sharing Economy, 
22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2016). 
 57. Scott M. Prange, Managing the Workforce in the Gig Economy, HAW. 
B.J., June 2016, at 4.  
 58. See Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, 
TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll; Elka 
Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. 
(May 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/what-is-the-gig 
-economy.htm. 
 59. See ROBERT HAHN & ROBERT METCALFE, BROOKINGS INST., THE 
RIDESHARE REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC SURVEY AND SYNTHESIS (2017), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ridesharing-oup-1117-v6 
-brookings1.pdf (describing and defining the growth of rideshare companies).  
 60. For a list of several prominent gig companies, including a description, 
the date formed, and data on size, see Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 28–
33. Each company has a slogan that highlights the creative and efficient nature 
of gig work. See generally About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/ 
about-us (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (“Airbnb is the easiest way for people to 
monetize their extra space and showcase it to an audience of millions.”); Mission 
& Values, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/mission (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (“Our 
mission is to reimagine commerce in ways that build a more fulfilling and last-
ing world.”); INSTACART, http://careers.instacart.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) 
(“[D]eliver[ing] the future of food to millions of customers.”); Lyft Launches 50+ 
Cities in Biggest Expansion Yet, LYFT BLOG, https://blog.lyft.com/posts/lyft 
-launches-biggest-expansion-yet (Feb. 23, 2017) (“[I]mprov[ing] lives by creating 
the first peer-to-peer ridesharing community.”); UBER, https://www.uber.com/ 
our-story (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (“Finding the way: Creating possibilities 
for riders, drivers, and cities.”). 
 61. See supra text accompanying note 3; Kasriel supra note 1 (“[M]any of 
today’s workers are swapping long commutes, outdated workplace hierarchies, 
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versatile and can be a lucrative alternative for different people 
for different reasons.62 Sometimes these jobs fill in gaps between 
full-time employment, but more often than not they offer a dif-
ferent way of life that has been embraced by modern society.63 
While an independent workforce has always existed in some 
form (independent contractors, freelancers, and the self-em-
ployed), these arrangements multiplied as traditional employ-
ment disappeared during the economic crisis of 2008.64 Even as 
economic conditions improve, companies still rely on independ-
ent workers, and workers continue to embrace their newfound 
independence. As of 2015, more than forty percent of adult work-
ers in the United States have performed gig work.65 This number 
is expected to surpass fifty percent by 2020.66 Not only is gig 
work prevalent, it is also profitable. In 2013, the industry gener-
ated fifteen billion dollars and is predicted to increase by an 
 
and the nine-to-five grind for the freedom to be their own boss and set their own 
hours . . . .”). 
 62. See supra pp. 887–88 (providing examples, including Uber and Lyft 
drivers, Airbnb hosts, Instacart shoppers, and Etsy shop owners); Zeninjor En-
wemeka, What the Booming Gig Economy Means for the Future of Work, WBUR: 
BOSTONOMIX (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2017/11/02/gig 
-economy (interviewing Aaron Ennis, “a super gig guy,” who prefers performing 
gig work than to having a full-time job and who has made six figures doing so, 
almost three times the amount he made running a computer center). 
 63. Nunberg, supra note 3; see Diane Mulcahy, Reasons To Embrace the Gig 
Economy, Not Fear It, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kauffman/2016/11/10/reasons-to-embrace-the-gig-economy-not-fear-it (“Like 
any change, it will be welcome for some and painful for others, but mostly what 
the gig economy does is give us the chance to take our lives—both professional 
and personal—away from employers and back into our own hands. That’s a 
change worth embracing.”). 
 64. See TERESA CARROLL, KELLY SERVICES INC., AGENTS OF CHANGE: IN-
DEPENDENT WORKERS ARE RESHAPING THE WORKFORCE 6–8 (2015); MCKINSEY 
GLOB. INST., HELP WANTED: THE FUTURE OF WORK IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
1 (2012). Today’s well-known gig companies were born during this time: Uber 
was created in 2008; Lyft was created in 2012; Airbnb was created in 2008; Etsy 
was created in 2005. 
 65. See Prange, supra note 57 (“According to a nascent poll by TIME . . . . 
these practices by companies have become so widespread that 44% of United 
States adults, or roughly 90 million workers, have at some time performed 
gigs.”). 
 66. See Scott G. Grubin, The Legal Lowdown On Employee Classification: 
An Interview with Employment Lawyer Scott Grubin of Wigdor LLP, WIGDOR 
LLP EMP. LIT. DIGEST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.wigdorlaw.com/employee 
-classification-interview-scott-grubin; see also Enwemeka, supra note 62 
(“[B]etween 2005 and 2015 over 90 percent of net employment growth in the 
U.S. was in the gig economy.”). 
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astounding 2200% to $335 billion by 2025.67 Gig work is “remak-
ing our industries, economy, and society[,] just as steam, elec-
tricity, and internal combustion did before them.”68 Scholars pro-
claim that the rise of the gig economy is the “industrial 
revolution of our times”69 and are confident it is here to stay.70 
C. HOW THE MODERN WORKFORCE INTERACTS WITH EXISTING 
EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION TESTS 
Although independent work has only recently become more 
popular,71 issues around correctly classifying independent work-
ers are not new.72 Worker misclassification lawsuits have been 
disputed in courts for over 100 years.73 In 1914, a coal company 
argued before Judge Learned Hand that it was “not in the busi-
ness of coal mining” and therefore did not employ miners, nor 
owe them employment benefits.74 Instead, the company claimed 
the miners were independent contractors who utilized the com-
pany’s property and sold the company the coal they collected.75 
Judge Hand held that the workers were in fact employees, “stat-
ing it would be ‘absurd to class[ify] such a miner as an independ-
ent contractor’ given that miners alone ‘carr[y] on the company’s 
 
 67. Shuford, supra note 55, at 310 (“PricewaterhouseCoopers, a company 
that does financial consulting among other things, found that the sharing econ-
omy generated $15 billion in 2013, and projects that annual revenue will in-
crease to $335 billion in 2025, a staggering 2,200 percent increase in 12 years.”). 
 68. Erik Brynjolfsson, Open Letter on the Digital Economy, MIT TECH. REV. 
(June 4, 2015) https://www.technologyreview.com/5/538091/open-letter-on-the 
-digital-economy. 
 69. Nunberg, supra note 3. 
 70. See Mulcahy, supra note 63 (“The gig economy is here to stay, is grow-
ing, and is fundamentally changing the way we work.”); LIBBY REDER, ASPEN 
INST., DATA ON THE SHARING & ON-DEMAND ECONOMY: WHAT WE KNOW AND 
DON’T KNOW 7 (2016) (“The quick pace of business growth in the sharing/on-
demand economy coupled with the dramatic growth of this area of the labor 
market suggest that both consumers and workers value these platforms, and 
they are likely here to stay.”). 
 71. See Shuford, supra note 55, at 301–02. 
 72. See Pinsof, supra note 9, at 342–43 (“While employment classification 
is an old legal conundrum, the rise of the ‘gig-economy’ is now pushing America’s 
broken system to the forefront of policymakers’ and courts’ agendas with new 
force.”). 
 73. Id. (“For over 100 years, America has classified workers into these two 
categories, yet the law continuously fails to do so in a uniform, predictable, and 
purposeful way.”). 
 74. Id. (citing Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 
1914)). 
 75. Id. 
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only business.’”76 Today, gig companies have caused fundamen-
tal changes in traditional business structures and substantive 
work, creating new challenges not so easily resolved in court.77  
Worker misclassification lawsuits have been filed against 
almost all major gig companies.78 Plaintiff workers seek relief 
for lost benefits and protections due to misclassification as inde-
pendent workers.79 Defendant companies hope to prevent or 
swiftly resolve these costly disputes. However, most suits end in 
a sizable settlement agreement, which leaves worker-classifica-
tion issues unresolved and companies financially damaged.80 For 
example, in 2014, Uber drivers in California and Massachusetts 
filed class-action lawsuits against Uber seeking reimbursement 
for business expenses.81 The drivers claimed they were incor-
rectly classified as independent contractors under California la-
bor law,82 and consequently were owed compensation for certain 
expenses.83 The parties decided to settle this suit for $100 mil-
lion in April 2016.84 This resolution has been touted as “historic” 
and “one of the largest ever [settlements] achieved on behalf of 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See DAVID WEIL, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ADMR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 
2015-1 (2015) (“Misclassification of employees as independent contractors is 
found in an increasing number of workplaces in the United States, in part re-
flecting larger restructuring of business organizations.”); see also MISCLASSIFI-
CATION OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 13, at 3 (describing the “seven factors the 
[Supreme] Court has considered significant” in distinguishing between employ-
ees and independent contractors). 
 78. Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transfor-
mation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584–85 tbl.1 (2016).  
 79. See Kessler, supra note 15. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Second Amended Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, O’Con-
nor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-
3826-EMC) (“Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of Uber drivers who have 
been misclassified as independent contractors and thereby required to pay busi-
ness expenses (such as for their vehicles, gas, and maintenance).”). 
 82. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (“For the purpose of determining 
whether an employer can rebut a prima facie showing of employment, the Su-
preme Court’s seminal opinion in Borello ‘enumerated a number of indicia of an 
employment relationship.’”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Hannah Levintova, Uber Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Drivers in His-
toric Class Action Settlement, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www 
.motherjones.com/politics/2016/uber-announces-it-will-pay100-million-drivers 
-historic-class-action-settlement. This ongoing settlement has not yet been ap-
proved by the court. 
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workers who alleged that they were improperly classified as in-
dependent contractors.”85 However historic, this settlement, and 
all those like it, has little legal significance except to further un-
derscore the law’s continuing inability to properly classify work-
ers. As the next Part of this Note demonstrates, the gig economy 
poses a unique set of challenges that make it especially difficult 
to properly classify workers with existing tests. This results in 
denied workers’ rights and dangerous limits on economic growth. 
It is therefore imperative that an immediate resolution is imple-
mented to protect workers and the gig economy the damaging 
effects of outdated employment laws. 
II.  EXISTING EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION TESTS DO 
NOT ADEQUATELY EMBRACE GIG ECONOMY WORKERS 
AND CREATE DANGEROUS OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC 
GROWTH   
Although many of the concerns about the employer-em-
ployee relationship that necessitated the development of employ-
ment laws during the Industrial Revolution are still present to-
day, certain principles that underlie these laws have become ill-
suited to properly regulate the modern economy. This Part ana-
lyzes the failure of employment law to adequately protect the gig 
economy’s independent workforce and the dangerous limits it 
places on economic growth. Section A discusses the challenge of 
accurately analyzing the control and independence factors in ex-
isting employee classification tests as they apply to gig workers, 
using the recent Uber lawsuit as an example. Section B explores 
the underlying fundamental tension between existing employee 
classification tests and the gig economy. This Section also as-
sesses how the existing legal regime ultimately harms both 
workers and companies in the gig economy. This Part demon-
strates the necessity of updating existing employment laws to 
preserve the gig economy.  
A. GIG WORKERS: AN AMBIGUOUS CLASSIFICATION 
The decision whether to classify gig workers as employees 
or independent contractors has perplexed state, federal, and for-
eign courts.86 In many ways, gig workers appear similar to inde-
pendent contractors because they have significant flexibility 
 
 85. Id.  
 86. See Cherry, supra note 78, at 579–94 (discussing lawsuits addressing 
this classification issue and noting that “[w]hile many lawsuits have been filed, 
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over the time, place, and manner of their work.87 However, gig 
companies still retain a measure of control and power over their 
workers that is reminiscent of traditional employment.88 This 
business model has left the gig economy conflicted over what the 
proper classification should be. 
Gig companies often declare their workers to be independent 
contractors due to their high level of flexibility and autonomy 
over their work, while gig workers, desiring the rights and ben-
efits of employment, seek to be classified as employees. In assert-
ing their respective positions, both sides of the debate rely on the 
central factors in existing classification tests: control and inde-
pendence.89 An employer has significant control over its employ-
ees and these employees are dependent on the employer, while a 
company has little control over its independent contractors and 
these contractors are, as the name suggests, fundamentally in-
dependent from the company.  
Gig workers do not neatly align with either of the available 
classifications. Gig work is characterized by its independence, 
offering the flexibility to accept or decline work at one’s leisure, 
in one’s own location, and by one’s own method.90 On the other 
hand, gig companies often implement policies and requirements 
that seek to limit the freedom of workers to set their own terms 
of service and control their professional behavior.91 Yet the rela-
tionship between gig workers and gig companies does generally 
remain temporary and detached, and as such, does not seem to 
justify burdening the company with the responsibility of full em-
ployee status.92 Thus gig work is forced into a legal gray area 
that tends to provoke conflict.93  
The controversy in classifying gig workers has been most 
prominently debated in the context of the recent Uber misclassi-
fication class-action lawsuit, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, 
 
there have been no definitive resolutions, binding precedent, or guidance.”); Sa-
rah O’Connor et al., Uber Drivers Win UK Legal Battle for Workers’ Rights, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a0bb02b2-9d0a 
-11e6-a6e4-8b8e77dd083a.  
 87. See Cherry, supra note 78, at 582. 
 88. See id. (“Control may be high given that companies like Uber use cus-
tomer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over workers, with 
consumers deputized to manage the workforce.”). 
 89. See supra Part I.A. 
 90. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 9.  
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. Id. at 8–9.  
 93. Id. 
 904 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:887 
 
Inc.94 Uber drivers contended that they were employees because 
of the control exerted over them by Uber.95 They cited Uber’s 
detailed requirements which include “rules regarding their con-
duct with customers, the cleanliness of their vehicles, their time-
liness in picking up customers and taking them to their destina-
tion, what they are allowed to say to customers, etc.”96 Drivers 
claimed that the failure to abide by these requirements made 
them subject to termination.97 Additionally, the drivers argued 
they are not independent from Uber because they were econom-
ically dependent on Uber for business and Uber was equally de-
pendent on drivers as the integral function of its business.98  
In contrast, Uber defended its classification of drivers as in-
dependent contractors by reasoning that Uber is not an employer 
of drivers but simply provides a platform that facilitates an in-
dependent business arrangement between driver and cus-
tomer.99 Consequently, Uber denied having meaningful control 
over drivers’ time, place, and manner of work.100 The overarch-
 
 94. In 2014, Uber drivers brought a lawsuit against Uber for misclassifying 
them as independent contractors. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83; 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
 95. Second Amended Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 5, O’Con-
nor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (No. 13-3826-EMC) (“[Drivers] are required to follow 
a litany of detailed requirements imposed on them by Uber and they are graded, 
and are subject to termination, based on their failure to adhere to these require-
ments.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Compare id. (“The drivers’ services are fully integrated into Uber ’s 
business, and without the drivers, Uber ’s business would not exist.”), and Plain-
tiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 6, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (No. 13-3826-EMC) (“Uber ’s system 
relies on drivers to function because, without drivers, there would be no one to 
pick up passengers, and no way for Uber to derive revenue by taking a percent-
age of the fare.”), with Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d 
Cir. 1914), and supra discussion Part I.C. 
 99. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141 (“Uber passes itself off as merely a 
technological intermediary between potential riders and potential drivers.”); 
Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Em-
ployers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y 
J. 619, 619 (2016). 
 100. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., UBERLITIGATION.COM, http://www 
.uberlitigation.com/faq.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter UBERLITIGA-
TION.COM] (“Uber ’s position is that it never sets drivers’ schedules, never re-
quires them to log into the Uber App for any minimum amount of time, never 
requires them to accept any particular trip request received via the Uber App, 
never assigns them a geographic territory, never restricts them from engaging 
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ing point of Uber’s argument was that Uber is a software com-
pany, not a rideshare company.101 It does not rent office space 
for its drivers, own any cars, or offer any of the driver training 
typical of transportation companies.102 Instead, its entire infra-
structure is a mobile-phone application. Drivers freely contract 
to utilize this technology.103 Thus, Uber contended, drivers were 
independent from Uber, and Uber exercised little control over 
their actions.104 
From a legal standpoint, both Uber and its drivers make 
plausible arguments for the proper classification.105 Uber driv-
ers exhibit characteristics of both employees and independent 
contractors. In some ways, Uber drivers are independent and au-
tonomous.106 In other ways, they depend on and are controlled 
by Uber.107 Like independent contractors, drivers have control 
over their work.108 They are free to set their working hours and 
location.109 They accept trips according to their own method and 
provide rides in their own manner, in addition to providing their 
own car to give rides.110 They are not subject to direct supervi-
sion from Uber.111 They are not economically dependent on Uber, 
as they can hold other jobs and perform services for other com-
panies, including rideshare competitors.112 They can also accept 
 
in another occupation or business, and never restricts them from simultaneous 
use of other apps like Lyft and Sidecar.”). 
 101. Prassl & Risak, supra note 99, at 637 (noting that in the United States, 
“the terms and conditions a customer must accept in order to download the re-
quired software (‘app’) . . . inform[s] customers in capital letters that they [must] 
‘ACKNOWLEDGE THAT UBER DOES NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION 
OR LOGISTICS SERVICES OR FUNCTION AS A TRANSPORTATION CAR-
RIER.’”). 
 102. Kessler, supra note 15 (“Gig economy companies do not own cars, hotels, 
or even their workers’ cleaning supplies. What they own is a marketplace with 
two sides. On one side are people who need a job done—a ride to the airport, a 
clean house, a lunchtime delivery. On the other are people who are willing to do 
that job.”). 
 103. UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive (“Drive when you want, earn what 
you need.”). 
 104. See UBERLITIGATION.COM, supra note 100. 
 105. See Carlson, supra note 20, at 338–53. 
 106. See Cherry, supra note 78, at 582. 
 107. Id. at 583. 
 108. How to Use the Uber Driver App, UBER, http://www.uber.com/drive/ 
resources/how-to-use-the-driver-app (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Scott Van Maldegiam, How to Drive for Uber and Lyft at the Same 
Time, RIDESHARE GUY BLOG & PODCAST, (July 28, 2016), https://www 
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or reject rides, permitting them to control their opportunity for 
profit or loss.113 
However, in many ways Uber exerts employer-like control 
over drivers. Drivers are given a guidebook that offers advice on 
the manner and method of optimal service. Drivers are also su-
pervised in part by the use of the Uber app, which monitors their 
driving activity and permits riders to give feedback.114 This cus-
tomer feedback can lead to termination if it becomes cumula-
tively negative.115 Drivers are also required to accept a certain 
number of rides per month or will be disconnected from the app, 
permitting Uber to have further control over drivers’ activity.116 
The only thing that is clear in this controversy is that the 
proper classification is ambiguous. Uber retains some control 
and power over its drivers, yet drivers benefit from a significant 
amount of flexibility and autonomy. This relationship falls 
within an uncontemplated space somewhere between employ-
ment and an independent-contractor relationship. This analysis 
parallels classification conflicts in most other gig companies—
“highlight[ing] the outdated nature of workers’ laws.”117 
Ultimately, it appears Uber and its drivers are likely to 
reach a settlement agreement in the O’Connor matter, or pro-
ceed to individual arbitration.118 Either result prevents an op-
 
.therideshareguy.com/how-to-drive-for-uber-and-lyft-at-the-same-time (ex-
plaining that many rideshare drivers utilize both companies and instructing 
listeners how to do so efficiently).  
 113. See Catherine Tucciarello, The Square Peg Between Two Round Holes: 
Why California’s Traditional Right to Control Test Is Not Relevant for On-De-
mand Workers, 13 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 351, 359–60 (2017); see also O’Connor 
v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82. F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The ‘most 
significant consideration’ is the putative employer ’s ‘right to control work de-
tails.’”). 
 114. Tucciarello, supra note 113, at 366.  
 115. Id.  
 116. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149 (“Uber considers ‘[r]ejecting too 
many trips’ to be a performance issue that could lead to possible termination 
from the Uber platform.”). 
 117. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Uber Case Highlights Outdated Worker Pro-
tection Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/ 
16/business/dealbook/uber-case-highlights-outdated-worker-protection-laws 
.html (“This case truly highlights the outdated nature of workers’ laws in Amer-
ica . . . .”). 
 118. Uber and its drivers reached a proposed settlement agreement in 2016, 
but the court declined to approve the settlement. The case is now stayed pending 
several appeals regarding the enforcement of the arbitration clause. Due to a 
ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it appears this case may be forced 
to proceed to individual arbitration. See Paresh Dave, In Stinging Decision for 
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portunity for the court’s consideration on the proper classifica-
tion of Uber drivers. Despite there being no expectation for a fi-
nal conclusion as to worker classification, the court has im-
portantly recognized the ambiguities in classifying rideshare 
drivers. The court acknowledged “there were sufficient allega-
tions . . . to make the existence of an employment relationship 
plausible . . . [but also] a number of factors [that] weigh against 
finding an employment relationship.”119 The court noted that 
“numerous factors point[ed] in opposing directions,”120 reasoning 
that “many of [these] factors . . . appear outmoded in this con-
text” because “Uber’s business model creates significant chal-
lenges” to the “application of the traditional test of employment” 
which “evolved under an economic model very different from the 
new ‘[gig] economy.’”121 This court correctly identified the heart 
of the issue in classifying drivers and other gig workers: there is 
an underlying conflict between the modern gig economy and out-
dated employment laws.  
B. A FUNDAMENTAL TENSION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
THE GIG ECONOMY 
The reason that gig workers are not easily classified as em-
ployees or independent contractors is due to a fundamental ten-
sion between the conventional notion of employment and gig 
work. In drafting employment laws, twentieth-century legisla-
tors seemed to rely on an incorrect belief that business and indi-
vidual interests are entirely at odds.122 Thus legislators at the 
 
Uber Drivers, Appeals Court Says They Must Go to Arbitration, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber 
-lawsuit-20160907-snap-story.html. For more details on this ongoing case, see 
http://www.uberlawsuit.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). For more details on the 
proposed settlement agreement, see Harry Campbell, Breaking News: Uber Set-
tles Employee Misclassification Lawsuit in California, RIDESHARE GUY BLOG & 
PODCAST (Apr. 21, 2016), https://therideshareguy.com/breaking-news-uber 
-settles-employee-misclassification-lawsuit-in-california. 
 119. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 6354534, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). 
 120. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153. 
 121. Id.  
 122. See Prange, supra note 57, at 7–8; supra Part I.B; see also Miriam A. 
Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1077–78 (2009) (“When Con-
gress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to help relieve the 
downward spiral of wages in the Great Depression, America’s workers com-
monly showed up to an employer ’s place of business, leaving little doubt if they 
were ‘working’ and thus entitled to the statute’s minimum wage. Times, and 
technologies, have changed. With modern computers, individuals often perform 
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time could not have conceived of a mutually beneficial business 
model that successfully operates on minimal operating costs, a 
remote technological marketplace, and international demand. 
Nor could they have anticipated that a workforce might value 
autonomous, short-term, flexible work over lifetime job security. 
Thus existing employment laws cannot possibly be expected to 
effectively apply to, let alone support, this type of economy. 
Even modern scholars often fail to understand the gig econ-
omy’s business model and criticize it as an example of abusive, 
greedy businesses taking advantage of vulnerable, victimized 
employees.123 However, the controversy is not nearly this simple. 
This business model is intended to be mutually beneficial.124 Gig 
companies use technology to create a marketplace that connects 
individuals in need of work with individuals in need of ser-
vices.125 It is true that businesses benefit financially from the 
independent contractor classification, but this also benefits 
workers by creating job opportunities. By employing a lean busi-
ness model, gig companies can operate efficiently and pass on 
savings to customers—simultaneously increasing demand for 
their services and generating a need for workers to fill this de-
mand, to the benefit of workers. Gig workers desire these job op-
portunities for the ability to set their own schedules, govern their 
own work methods, and freely choose and reject projects from 
 
work on someone else’s behalf while sitting at home, using not their employer ’s 
factory machinery, but rather a computer they purchased for themselves, as 
well as their own Internet connection. The work is often engaging and is far 
more pleasant than operating a drill press of the 1930s. In ways, some of this 
online ‘labor ’ can even feel creative, or be part of a game or a competition.”). 
 123. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 
85, 91 (2015) (“Uber has faced criticism along at least six dimensions.”); Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin et al., Washington Should Harness the Power of the Gig Economy, 
HILL (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy 
-budget/313512-washington-should-harness-the-power-of-the-gig-economy 
(“Policymakers often assume that the rapid growth in the gig economy is leaving 
workers vulnerable, and they have sought to constrain the independent nature 
of these jobs.”). 
 124. See Kessler, supra note 15 (“But it’s safe to say that there are ad-
vantages to being an employee (security, safety laws, minimum wage, benefits) 
and that there are also advantages to being an independent contractor (freedom, 
independence). Similarly, there are advantages to hiring employees (quality 
control, dependable workers) and hiring contract workers (cheaper, don’t need 
to guarantee work).”). 
 125. See Rogers, supra note 123, at 86–87 (“Uber ’s business model is actu-
ally quite simple: its smartphone-based app connects drivers offering rides and 
passengers seeking them, passengers pay mileage-based fees through credit 
cards that the company keeps on file, and Uber then takes a percentage of each 
fare and gives the rest to drivers.”); supra Part I.B. 
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one or many companies.126 The gig business model allows indi-
viduals to work free from “structures of the traditional employ-
ment relationship.”127 More importantly, it creates an oppor-
tunity for individuals to avoid unemployment and poverty by 
providing a necessary work alternative to disappearing manu-
facturing and other industrial-era jobs.128 The gig economy is fi-
nancially lucrative for both the individual and the workforce as 
a whole, and harnesses innovation and creativity to deliver bet-
ter, faster, cheaper services to customers. 
As the gig business model benefits both gig companies and 
workers in theory, criticism is more properly directed at the laws 
that regulate these relationships. Existing employment laws 
force an unsuitable choice between classifying a worker as an 
employee or independent contractor, a binary choice that results 
in workers receiving all of the benefits and protections of employ-
ment laws or none of them.129 Additionally, the employee classi-
fication places an extreme financial burden on emerging compa-
nies to provide benefits to workers, while the independent 
contractor classification lets companies avoid responsibility for 
workers altogether. These classifications effectively harm both 
 
 126. Michelle M. Lasswell, Note, Workers’ Compensation: Determining the 
Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 43 DRAKE L. 
REV. 419, 422 (1994) (“From the worker ’s viewpoint, being classified as an inde-
pendent contractor also has advantages. An independent contractor is an entre-
preneur who can take on several specialized projects. The independent contrac-
tor has the freedom to choose the method for accomplishing the job and is free 
from the structures of the traditional employment relationship. The independ-
ent contractor can also deduct expenses that employees cannot, such as meals 
and entertainment, and taxes are not withheld from the wages.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 123 (“[E]vidence indicates that the gig 
economy may be countercyclical in nature, and its rapid growth in the years 
following the Great Recession provided already struggling workers a flexible 
way to earn additional income where traditional payroll jobs failed. . . . The gut 
instinct that gig economy workers are vulnerable is correct, but for the wrong 
reasons. Gig economy workers are vulnerable because traditional payroll jobs 
failed to deliver sufficient job growth and pay increases during the recession. 
Without the gig economy, these struggles very well could have been a lot 
worse.”). 
 129. Full protections and benefits are given to workers classified as employ-
ees, whereas these are not given to independent contractors. This begs the ques-
tion why there is not a more feasible middle ground that would target middle-
ground workers like gig workers. See infra Part III.B.2 for a proposed answer 
to this question. See also Enwemeka, supra note 62 (“‘[I]f you look at our labor 
market, it’s very clear that it’s set up to essentially penalize anybody that 
doesn’t have a full-time job . . . .’ [S]o . . . what’s really needed is a good hard 
look at the entire structure of our labor market.” (quoting Dane Mulcahy)). 
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gig workers and gig companies by forcing a choice between pro-
tecting workers and promoting economic growth.  
If classified as an independent contractor, workers have lim-
ited access to fair wages, overtime compensation, unemployment 
insurance, social security benefits, disability insurance, health 
insurance, workers compensation, retirement savings plans, and 
many other benefits that employees are entitled to.130 The grow-
ing popularity of nontraditional employment relationships has 
revealed the inherent unfairness in the independent contractor 
classification. As an important part of the modern workforce, gig 
workers are indeed owed at least some of the rights and protec-
tions of traditional employment, and gig companies ought to be 
held responsible for providing these rights. Without these rights, 
workers have no financial security or social safety net to fall back 
on.131 However, because the outdated laws that govern employee 
classification force a rigid choice between the two classifications, 
gig companies do, more often than not, choose the independent 
contractor classification, as it creates embedded cost savings 
which are crucial to their lean business model. In some ways, 
these savings can be deemed unjustifiable, as they are the result 
of avoiding many responsibilities for their workers’ rights and 
benefits.132 This choice is merely the lesser of two evils for these 
companies. Gig companies are exposed to the risk of costly and 
damaging class-action litigation in choosing the independent 
contractor classification.133 They are also limited from imple-
 
 130. Pinsof, supra note 9, at 353. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Davey Alba, Instacart Shoppers Can Now Choose to be Real Employees, 
WIRED (June 22, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/instacart-shoppers-can 
-now-choose-real-employees (“According to calculations by the National Em-
ployment Law Project, businesses stand to save up to 30 percent of their payroll 
tax costs by choosing to classify workers as independent contractors.”); Kessler, 
supra note 15 (“Not being responsible for employees’ taxes and benefits allows 
companies like Handy to operate with 20% to 30% less in labor costs than the 
incumbent competition, leading to eye-popping numbers like Uber ’s $40 billion 
valuation . . . .”). 
 133. SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FLEXIBLE STAFFING SOLU-
TIONS § 9 (Aug. 1999), http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/herman/reports/ 
futurework/conference/staffing/9_standards.htm (“In the absence of clear legal 
language, employee coverage and employer liability is being determined by the 
courts, which often apply different standards to different laws and sometimes 
even different standards to the same law. Such ambiguity causes considerable 
confusion and legal expense for businesses.”); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethink-
ing the Worker Classification Test: Employees, Entrepreneurship, and Empow-
erment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 98 (2013) (“The ‘uncertainty can become a 
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menting efficient and protective employee and workplace poli-
cies for fear of crossing into employer-like territory.134 The un-
certainty of the correct classification for their workers forces 
companies to operate in a legal gray area that has financial and 
reputational consequences for the companies, even if they are 
acting reasonably in the best interests of their business.135 
The only present alternative—classifying workers as em-
ployees—is equally problematic. Though this classification 
would provide workers with the legal benefits and protections 
intended to cover them, it creates significant issues for gig com-
panies. Forcing employer status on fledgling gig companies 
threatens their financial stability, as employee-based social pro-
grams are extremely costly.136 These companies are built so as 
to require minimal operating expenses, and the costs of provid-
ing the full range of employee benefits to workers would capsize 
this lean business model.137 This added expense would make it 
 
breeding ground for litigation.’”); Noam Scheiber, A Middle Ground Between 
Contract Worker and Employee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015) https://www 
.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/a-middle-ground-between-contract-worker-
and-employee.html (“Many start-ups can’t withstand a lawsuit even if a com-
pany is in the right.”). 
 134. Kessler, supra note 15 (“They are going to have a choice between taking 
actions that make them more marketable, and thus becoming vulnerable as em-
ployers under these laws, and remaining completely hands off.”); Scheiber, su-
pra note 133 (“Under an employment model, by contrast, the company has a 
much more reliable and knowledgeable work force, one that can be held to a 
specific standard of quality and a more consistent schedule.”). 
 135. See Leslie Hook, Uber and Airbnb’s Business Models Come Under Scru-
tiny, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/381e27ee-c685 
-11e6-8f29-9445cac8966f (“[O]ver the past 12 months, these two icons . . . have 
clashed again and again with courts and lawmakers, and found their businesses 
constrained by increasing regulation.”). 
 136. Julie Verhage, An Expert in Valuation Says Uber Is Only Worth $27 
Billion, Not $62.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/an-expert-in-valuation-says-uber 
-may-have-already-peaked (claiming Uber ’s financial worth is threatened by 
the risk of operating getting more expensive as this would necessarily reduce 
its business valuation and deter investors); Douglas MacMillan et al., Uber 
Drivers Settle with Ride-Hailing Company in Labor Dispute, WALL ST. J. (April 
21, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-drivers-settle-with-ride-hailing 
-company-in-labor-dispute-1461292153 (“Concerns over the status of gig work-
ers have caused tech investors and entrepreneurs to become more cautious 
about on-demand businesses. Some startups . . . have been unable to secure new 
funding and were forced to shut down . . . .”). 
 137. Hook, supra note 135 (“In the US, many so-called sharing economy com-
panies that rely on independent contractors could see their business models up-
ended if courts determine that their workers should be treated as employees.”); 
Kessler, supra note 15 (“If we continue to not see reform, then it will probably 
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likely that these companies are unable to provide the benefits 
they are known for: flexibility for workers and affordability for 
customers. For workers, employee status would revoke many of 
the most positive qualities of gig work: it would limit the flexi-
bility, freedom, and control available to independent contractors, 
as employers are granted a significant amount of control and su-
pervision over their employees.138 These added costs would also 
increase the low prices most valued by customers and in turn 
reduce demand and need for gig workers. Many scholars warn 
that employer status could financially destroy many gig compa-
nies and predict that the gig economy may cease to exist alto-
gether under this classification.139 
This seemingly unsolvable controversy is a result of the ide-
ological dichotomy that founded existing employment laws. Em-
ployment laws heavily regulate businesses in order to protect 
traditional worker rights and benefits, but this is accomplished 
at the cost of economic prosperity. Because these laws are based 
on principles that pit businesses against individuals, they make 
it impossible to guarantee both worker rights and promote eco-
nomic growth. This is demonstrated by employment law’s binary 
employee-classification system.140 The rigid structure of this sys-
tem creates an unnecessary choice between classifying workers 
as independent contractors, which facilitates efficient business 
and spurs economic growth but fails to fully protect workers, and 
classifying workers as employees, which protects worker rights 
and benefits but limits economic growth. Thus the classifications 
require a choice that either eliminates necessary protections for 
 
cut out a lot of services and opportunities, because not everybody can put people 
on full-time or part-time paid benefits. It just wouldn’t make sense.”). 
 138. Employers may supervise their employees more than independent con-
tractors and must do so for purposes of collecting certain required information 
for applying employee benefits. It is relevant to note that the collection of this 
information creates practical difficulties in quantifying this information. See 
Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 13 (“The boundary between work and non-
work for independent workers is largely indeterminable.”).  
 139. JAMES SHERK, HERITAGE FOUND., THE RISE OF THE “GIG” ECONOMY: 
GOOD FOR WORKERS AND CONSUMERS 28 (Oct. 7, 2016); see Holtz-Eakin et al., 
supra note 123 (“[T]he shoot first, ask questions later attitude taken by local 
policymakers could be a big mistake. It could end up hurting the very workers 
that the policies are intended to help.”). Many of the arguments presented in 
this paragraph are focused on gig companies in their beginning development 
stages. Once these companies are off the ground they may become profitable 
enough to afford at least some employee benefits. Uber has likely progressed to 
this stage by now and thus is being used in this Note as an example because of 
its notoriety, not because it is the gig company most at risk.  
 140. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
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gig workers or eliminates necessary gig jobs altogether. Neither 
option is suitable for the gig economy.141 The gig economy mis-
classification issues have revealed that employment law’s exist-
ing dual-classification system no longer effectively governs the 
employer-employee relationship.142 
Worse than ineffectiveness, these limited classifications are 
likely to regulate the gig economy to death. As the world mod-
ernizes and industrial jobs inevitably disappear, the gig economy 
presents a vital opportunity to embrace change and stimulate 
long-term economic prosperity.143 Without this opportunity, the 
future of the workforce is unclear. Therefore, it is in the best in-
terest of the future of the workforce, businesses, and economy as 
a whole to develop new laws that prevent the destruction of the 
gig economy. 
III.  IMMEDIATE, COMPREHENSIVE, AND SUSTAINABLE 
LEGAL REFORM IS NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE GIG 
ECONOMY   
A prosperous gig economy requires a modernized legal struc-
ture that promotes both economic growth and worker security. 
Gig companies need legislative support that encourages entre-
preneurial innovation, embraces changing business structures, 
and fosters economic security. Gig workers need legislative ac-
tion that stimulates the creation of new jobs, protects worker 
rights, and equalizes access to employee benefits. The funda-
mental question is then: “[H]ow can we protect workers in this 
new environment, while, at the same time, reaping the benefits 
 
 141. Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 8 (“Forcing these new forms of work 
into a traditional employment relationship could be an existential threat to the 
emergence of online-intermediated work, with adverse consequences for work-
ers, consumers, businesses, and the economy.”). 
 142. Scheiber, supra note 133 (“[M]any workers in the so-called online gig 
economy should have more rights and protections than most do now. At the 
same time, . . . ‘forcing these new forms of work into a traditional employment 
relationship could be an existential threat to the emergence of online-interme-
diated work.’”). 
 143. See Andrei Hagiu, Work 3.0: Redefining Jobs and Companies in the 
Uber Age, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 29, 2015), http:// 
hbswk.hbs.edu/item/work-3-0-redefining-jobs-and-companies-in-the-uber-age 
(“[W]hen many Americans remain underemployed and most workers feel time 
crunched, the last thing we want to do is squander labor market opportunity 
and flexibility.”). 
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of change and innovation?”144 This Part will suggest a compre-
hensive answer to this question. Section A will briefly review ex-
isting remedies and explain why they are insufficient. Section B 
will propose a three-step reform proposal based on the most im-
portant components of a satisfactory resolution. This Part advo-
cates for a remedy that provides both short- and long-term relief, 
and fairly balances protections for the gig economy and its work-
ers.  
A. INSUFFICIENCY OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED REMEDIES 
As illustrated above,145 worker classification in the gig econ-
omy has produced a delicate legal conflict. Resolving this issue 
requires immediate yet sustainable action. Although the federal 
government has identified this as a central issue to be examined 
in the near future, a specific solution has yet to be disclosed.146 
In the absence of official action, scholars have advanced many 
possible theories on this topic. These theories range from a sim-
ple reinterpretation of existing employee classification tests,147 
to the creation of a third category of worker,148 to resolution by 
contract,149 to simply maintaining the status quo.150 However 
 
 144. Krueger, supra note 17, at 2; see Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 123 (“In-
stead of trying to limit independent work in favor of traditional work, policy-
makers should look for ways to harness the strengths of the gig economy so that 
it can continue to provide a buffer for workers who fall on hard times.”); see also 
Gapper, supra note 2 (“The new world of work must chart a course between the 
twin dangers of corporate conformism and worker exploitation.”); Hagiu, supra 
note 143 (“We are on the cusp of a sea change in how we view employment. If 
we manage this shift well, we’ll be creating an engine for economic growth. Mess 
it up and we’ll stifle a major driver of innovation, business creation, and jobs.”). 
 145. See supra Part II. 
 146. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 
PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021 2, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep 
-2017.pdf (“The commission adds a new priority to address issues related to 
complex employment relationships and structures in the 21st century work-
place, focusing specifically on temporary workers, staffing agencies, independ-
ent contractor relationships, and the on-demand economy.”). 
 147. Carlson, supra note 20, 368; Maltby & Yamada, supra note 34, at 274; 
Means & Seiner, supra note 19, at 1545–46; see Bodie, supra note 30; Keith 
Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the 
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2016). 
 148. Tucciarello, supra note 113, at 369; Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 
27. 
 149. See Carboni, supra note 56, at 38–40 (noting that the FLSA’s under-
standing of a dependent contractor could be helpful in the creation of a third 
type of worker).  
 150. See supra Part I.C (explaining how modern workers are classified 
within the existing employee classification framework). 
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promising and well conceived, these stand-alone suggestions are 
inadequate on their own. Reinterpretation will only perpetuate 
legal uncertainty by continuing to permit inconsistent applica-
tion of the already ambiguous employee classification tests. And, 
as discussed above,151 these tests emerged from legal principles 
that are now outdated and problematic in a modern context. 
While one of the better suggestions, the theory of creating a third 
classification will require a long, slow legislative process, leaving 
the future of the gig economy open to the immediate risks of 
forced employee classification. A contractual resolution is an en-
tirely impractical suggestion, as it fails to recognize or rectify the 
existing inequitable bargaining power between worker and com-
pany and would increase worker vulnerabilities and limit worker 
legal protections. And this Note has already demonstrated that 
existing tests only offer insufficient remedies.152 Therefore, at 
this point, there has not been a fully adequate solution proposed. 
B. A COMPREHENSIVE REMEDY 
Ultimately, a comprehensive remedy is required.153 Most 
importantly, this action ought to harness the unique benefits of 
the gig economy.154 It must implement durable changes that re-
solve present legal ambiguities. It must also strive to establish a 
more reasonable balance between business and individual inter-
ests than currently exists. Thus the proposed reforms should 
achieve three main objectives: preserve economic opportunity, 
promote economic efficiency, and protect economic security. Con-
gress can carry out these objectives by: (1) passing immediate 
legislation that develops a legal safe harbor for gig companies, 
which will preserve economic opportunity; (2) reexamining em-
ployee classification tests to minimize legal uncertainty and pro-
mote economic efficiency; and (3) creating benefit equality 
among all individuals by detaching certain benefits from employ-
 
 151. See supra Part II.B. 
 152. See supra Part II. 
 153. This Note’s three-step proposal expands on, and combines, solutions 
proposed in a brief article written by economic analyst James Sherk at the Her-
itage Foundation and a discussion paper entitled The Hamilton Project written 
by Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger at the Brookings Institution. See SHERK, 
supra note 139; Harris & Krueger, supra note 8. 
 154. Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 123 (“Instead of trying to limit independ-
ent work in favor of traditional work, policymakers should look for ways to har-
ness the strengths of the gig economy so that it can continue to provide a buffer 
for workers who fall on hard times.”). 
 916 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:887 
 
ment and requiring basic rights for all workers, which will pro-
tect future economic security. 
1. Implement Immediate Safe Harbor 
Congress should temporarily protect gig companies from le-
gal uncertainty and the potentially fatal effects of forced adop-
tion of the employee classification through enacting a safe har-
bor law that statutorily permits gig companies to classify 
workers as either employees or independent contractors.155 This 
statute would effectively shield gig companies from damaging 
litigation battles and future court orders that interpret the con-
trol or economic realities tests to force employer status on gig 
companies.156 This step is imperative to preserve job growth and 
promote economic opportunity. By insulating emerging gig com-
panies from this significant financial burden during their early 
periods of survival and development, such legislation would al-
low these companies to reach rapid growth and stable ma-
turity.157 During this process, these companies can focus on in-
novation and job creation, benefitting workers and consumers. 
Once better established, these companies will be prepared and 
financially strong enough to withstand the burden of providing 
more rights and benefits to workers.158 Though this proposal lim-
its worker protections in the near future, this short-term handi-
cap is far better than the alternative, which would permanently 
eliminate these jobs altogether. This step seeks to put business 
interests first in the short term, so that individual and business 
interests can both be met in the long term. 
 
 155. See SHERK, supra note 139, at 7–8 (noting that many workers are drawn 
to companies such as Uber because of the work’s independent and flexible na-
ture).  
 156. See id. (“Congress should ensure that litigation does not stifle the gig 
economy.”); Carlson, supra note 20, at 298. (“Our employment statutes, how-
ever, rarely accept the challenge posed by this problem. The real work of iden-
tifying ‘employees’ and their employment relationships has always been in the 
courts. Statutory non-definitions, such as those in the FLSA, might well be 
viewed as mandates for the courts to continue in this mission.”). 
 157. See generally Neil C. Churchill & Virginia L. Lewis, The Five Stages of 
Small Business Growth, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 1983), https://hbr.org/1983/05/ 
the-five-stages-of-small-business-growth (identifying the early stages of a busi-
ness as the most financially unstable).  
 158. Without the second step of this proposal, at this time these companies 
would likely be required to classify some of their workers as employees and take 
on those costs. With the second step of this proposal, these companies would 
likely need to classify some workers as full employees, but the majority of gig 
workers would be classified as the middle-ground third classification, to be in-
troduced infra Section III.B.2.  
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Unlike much of the existing academic literature on this 
topic, this step of the proposal admittedly favors protecting gig 
companies. However, this pro-business and pro-technological 
strategy has been adopted by Congress in the past. In 2012, Con-
gress implemented the JOBS (Jumpstart Our Business Startup) 
Act, which relaxed SEC-imposed registration requirements for 
IPOs for emerging growth companies.159 Before that, in 1998, 
Congress enacted the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which pro-
tected the informational potential of the Internet from federal, 
state, and local governments imposing discriminatory Internet-
only taxes.160 These laws were passed to protect emerging busi-
nesses and harness technological advances in an effort to pro-
mote beneficial long-term growth, just as this step’s safe-harbor 
provision seeks to do. Fortunately, the deregulatory agenda of 
the United States’ current political leaders also make this type 
of legislative action uniquely plausible at this time.161 
Logistically, this legislation should set limits on the legal 
shelter so as to avoid indefinite immunity for gig companies. 
Both a five-year time limit and a monetary ceiling could be im-
plemented to allow for companies to reach stable growth before 
subjecting them to full employer status. These dual limitations 
would prevent companies from taking advantage of the safe har-
bor beyond a true need for it. Those that oppose this idea might 
still contend that this safe harbor would last indefinitely, effec-
tively neglecting gig workers permanently. However, in addition 
to the proscribed financial ceiling, the next step of this proposal 
would effectually end the safe harbor for gig companies and pro-
vide needed relief to gig workers.  
2. Reexamine Employee Classification Tests 
With a safe harbor in place to protect the gig economy, Con-
gress should use the intervening time to thoughtfully modify the 
 
 159. Jamie Farrell, The JOBS Act: What Startups and Small Businesses 
Need to Know, FORBES: WORK IN PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/09/21/the-jobs-act-what-startups-and-small 
-businesses-need-to-know-infographic. This proposal suggests using the JOBS 
Act to develop parameters to define emerging gig companies. 
 160. JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INTERNET TAX FREE-
DOM ACT: IN BRIEF (Apr. 13, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43772.pdf.  
 161. See Anita Balakrishnan, Trump’s Labor Pick Will Be a Big Win for ‘Gig 
Economy’ Start-Ups Like Uber, CNBC: TRUMPONOMICS (Dec. 8, 2016), https:// 
www.cnbc.com/2016/12/08/trumps-labor-pick-will-be-a-big-win-for-gig-economy 
-start-ups-like-uber.html; Frank Chaparro, The Wave of Wall Street Deregula-
tion Is Upon Us, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
the-wave-of-financial-deregulation-is-upon-us-2017-2. 
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boundaries of existing employee classification tests to better en-
compass gig workers. During this time, Congress can addition-
ally clarify the factors most important in the application of these 
tests so as to resolve long-existing judicial uncertainty.162 This 
process would likely lead to the development of a third worker 
classification, which would serve to fill the existing gap in the 
employee classification tests. 
A middle-ground classification, creatively labeled by others 
as the “dependent contractor” classification,163 would operate to 
encompass the legal gray area between employee and independ-
ent contractor where gig workers seem to fit best. This classifi-
cation could be defined by building off of, and differentiating 
from, the existing classifications. Whereas employees have little 
independence and employers have significant control, and inde-
pendent contractors have significant independence and compa-
nies have little control over them, dependent contractors fall 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. They are character-
ized by increased worker independence and decreased company 
control from traditional employees, while not quite reaching the 
level of independent contractors. Whatever the exact parameters 
of this classification, it is important that Congress not simply 
create another classification with ambiguous boundaries, fur-
ther complicating worker classifications. 
As to the effect of this third classification, the benefits and 
rights could be crafted around the implied breakdown between 
legal benefits versus fundamental rights in the existing tests. 
Under existing tests, employees receive both benefits and rights, 
and independent contractors receive neither. Thus the third 
classification, situated between these two ends of the spectrum, 
would receive fundamental rights, but not benefits. This would 
mean that the middle classification would receive many of the 
protections afforded to employees under the economic realities 
test, including minimum and fair pay, health and family leave, 
and protections from discrimination under Title VII, which can 
 
 162. The tests will likely focus more on the factors of independence and con-
trol and reduce some of the extraneous factors so as to create a more uniform 
application of the tests. 
 163. Tucciarello, supra note 113, at 369. While this is an appropriate title, it 
may create confusion if the definition of dependent is not carefully explained. 
For example, gig workers are not always dependent on one company. Often Uber 
drivers double as drivers for their competitor, Lyft, in order to maximize their 
productivity. These workers would not necessarily be dependent but should be 
included among this middle-ground classification.  
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be best defined as rights.164 However, unlike employees, this new 
classification would not be owed the benefits applied under the 
control test, including retirement, health, and welfare benefit 
plans, unionization and tax withholding. This allocation will pro-
vide gig workers with the fundamental rights that they are 
owed, but, in exchange for the flexibility and independence of-
fered by gig work, not the greater economic benefits of full em-
ployment. This creates a fair balance between gig worker and gig 
company and seamlessly fills the gap between the existing clas-
sifications.165  
These amendments would require a long-term, thoughtful 
effort to understand and draft laws that embrace the changing 
nature of the workforce in the twenty-first century. It is true that 
this could take a significant amount of time, but if implemented 
as part of a multi-step plan, in conjunction with the safe harbor 
addressed in step one of this proposal, Congress would be able to 
implement a reasonable timeline for completion. Additionally, 
the strong political incentive to further create protections for gig 
workers to offset the effects of the safe harbor would hopefully 
force partisan compromise. Regardless of the length of time this 
legislation would take to implement, this step is vitally im-
portant for the longevity of gig work, as well as all future forms 
of nontraditional work. This step enhances economic efficiency 
by diminishing legal uncertainty.  
This step of the proposal is only effective in preserving the 
gig economy if preceded by the safe harbor discussed in the first 
step. Alone it could not be implemented quickly enough to pro-
tect gig companies. It is also best followed by the final step of this 
proposal, which seeks to universalize employee benefits so that 
they are readily available to all workers, no matter the classifi-
cation. 
 
 164. See Caroline Fredrickson, Op-Ed: Is Your Uber Driver an Independent 
Contractor or an Employee? It Makes a Difference, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-fredrickson-are-uber-drivers 
-independent-contractors-or-employees-20150605-story.html (“[These are] 
‘basic needs,’ not bonuses: ‘They should be part of our bottom line as a society.’”). 
 165. See Carboni, supra note 56, at 37 (“This third category of worker, or the 
‘dependent contractor,’ seeks to lessen the burden on both the employers and 
the workers in the sharing economy.”). 
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3. Create Benefit Equality for All 
As a very long-term goal, Congress should seek to separate 
social benefits from employment, creating equal benefit oppor-
tunity for all individuals.166 This ideal would seek to strengthen 
the social safety net for all individuals by guaranteeing equal 
access to certain traditional employee-only benefits.167 This 
would ensure that nontraditional work forms are not disadvan-
taged simply because they do not fit the traditional notion of em-
ployment. Universalized benefits would help alleviate the conse-
quences of a reduced workforce due to further technological 
advances.168 This action would also neutralize many of the key 
advantages and disadvantages between existing worker classifi-
cations, which would increase legal flexibility and reduce finan-
cial incentives.169  
Undoubtedly, this step of the proposal would be extremely 
complex and drawn out. Getting Congress to organize, draft, and 
agree on universalized benefits will likely be a development un-
seen for many years.170 However, this is an important step that 
 
 166. These benefits would include retirement, health and insurance benefits, 
as well as equalized tax treatment. SHERK, supra note 139, at 29 (“[Congress 
should] create equal benefits between the self-employed and formal employ-
ees.”); Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor 
Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653, 686 (2016) (“‘[T]oo much of the welfare state is 
delivered through employers . . . [it] should be tied to the individual and made 
portable.’ Policy makers need to focus on a potential extension of social protec-
tion and develop new tools for ‘delivering core labor rights.’”). 
 167. Kristen V. Brown, How Much Would It Cost Uber to Make Drivers Em-
ployees? (Hint: It’s a Lot), SPLINTER (June 19, 2015), http://www.splinternews 
.com/how-much-would-it-cost-uber-to-make-drivers-employees-1793848516 
(“‘Rather than forcing full-time employment on on-demand work firms, we 
should instead pursue a policy direction that creates a comparable safety net 
for workers who are not full-time employees[.]’”); James Surowiecki, Gigs with 
Benefits, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits (“The bigg[est] issue here, though, is the outdated 
nature of our social safety net. It’s still dependent on the idea of the full-time 
employee, who gets health care, a pension, unemployment insurance, and so on 
from one company. That worked fine in a world of stable employment, but lots 
of Americans no longer live in that world and plenty more will be joining 
them.”). 
 168. This is already being explored in other countries. See, e.g., Ivana 
Kottasova, Finland Is Giving 2,000 Citizens a Guaranteed Income, CNN: 
MONEY (Jan. 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/02/news/economy/finland 
-universal-basic-income.  
 169. Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 15. 
 170. However, legislators have begun moving in this direction with the pro-
posal of a new bill that would set aside funds for a grant program to help local 
governments innovate their employment benefit systems. While this action is 
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would revolutionize employment law for the betterment of the 
workforce. It would permit the workforce to adapt to and sustain 
any future economic changes, which will likely include an in-
crease in innovative and nontraditional jobs. This step seeks, in 
the long term, to carry out the overarching goal of this Note: to 
change the dichotomous nature of the law, shifting the legal fo-
cus away from traditional employment and towards new forms 
of work. Laws must embrace the future, not cling to the past.171  
  CONCLUSION   
The gig economy developed from a simple entrepreneurial 
vision: to directly connect supply and demand. This idea has cre-
ated an economic structure that transforms the way businesses, 
workers, and customers interact. It has utilized technology and 
creativity to provide better services for consumers and flexible 
opportunities for workers. And it has fundamentally changed the 
way society views employment. It has empowered workers of all 
demographics by giving them a chance to provide for themselves 
on their own schedule, under their own terms, and in their own 
manner. It also has provided crucial economic relief by creating 
job opportunities to replace disappearing traditional jobs. It has 
brought necessary change to a struggling and stagnant economy. 
However, the twentieth-century legal framework has posed 
significant challenges to this change and threatens the existence 
of the gig economy. Employment law was developed in a bygone 
era when the employer-employee relationship was new and rap-
idly growing. Legislators were extremely concerned about em-
ployers overpowering vulnerable employees. Laws were imple-
mented to protect these workers’ legal rights and benefits. But 
they were drafted such that business interests were incompati-
ble with individual interests. This framework is unsuitable for 
the gig economy, which seeks to align business and individual 
 
small, it is an important first step that acknowledges the need for change to 
accommodate different forms of work. See Melissa Locker, A Bill That Makes It 
Easier for Gig Economy Workers to Get Benefits Was Just Introduced in Con-
gress, FAST COMPANY (May 26, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/4038971/ 
bill-that-makes-it-easier-for-gig-economy-workers-to-get-benefits-is-with-the 
-senate. 
 171. See Gapper, supra note 2 (“The task is to limit the downside of the new 
economy without curtailing job growth or preventing people from working in the 
way they prefer. There is a danger of romanticising the past benefits of perma-
nent full-time employment and fixed-job contracts when many now want alter-
natives.”). 
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interests. It forces an unsatisfactory choice between worker clas-
sifications that either protect worker rights and benefits or pro-
motes economic growth, but cannot accomplish both.  
Unsurprisingly, this has created conflict between workers 
and businesses. The worker classification controversy has 
played out in extensive litigation, most prominently in the recent 
Uber lawsuit. While the Uber case offers a single straightfor-
ward example, this issue affects millions of workers and many 
promising gig companies. Often, other affected companies are 
smaller and significantly more fragile than Uber, making them 
more susceptible to this issue. This widespread conflict has 
forced to the forefront of legal discussion a single question: how 
can laws best protect workers, while at the same time harness-
ing the benefits of the gig economy? 
This Note has proposed a comprehensive answer to that 
question. The answer provides a sustainable three-step ap-
proach that protects the future of the gig economy in the short, 
long, and very long term. Together, these three proposals com-
pose a legal regime that reasonably balances business and indi-
vidual interests. The initial proposal requires swift action to pre-
vent permanent financial damage to the gig economy, securing 
job opportunities, and supporting technological innovation. The 
second proposal asks for a diligent review and redrafting of em-
ployment laws and classification tests in light of changes in the 
modern workforce. The final proposal advocates for a transfor-
mation of the social welfare system that guarantees economic se-
curity for all individuals and reduces corresponding financial in-
centives for businesses. These three proposals seek to confront 
the legal challenges raised by the gig economy in such a way that 
embraces innovation and growth without exploiting workers.  
At a time when courts are struggling to classify gig workers, 
gig companies are unsure of their future, and gig workers are 
demanding answers, it is critical now, at this crucial point, that 
next steps taken efficiently and effectively support the future of 
the gig economy. The success of the gig economy depends on it. 
If we are not careful, we will kill the goose that has laid the 
golden egg. 
